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TORTS-ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK- COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-The
Supreme Court of Florida has unanimously held that with the adop-
tion of comparative negligence, the defense of assumption of risk is
supplanted by the concept of contributory negligence.
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
Kevin Blackburn, Jr., a passenger in a dune buggy operated by
David Dorta, was injured when the vehicle overturned. Kevin, a
minor, and his father, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Dade
County, Florida, against David Dorta, also a minor, and his father.
The complaint alleged that the defendant had operated the dune
buggy negligently, thereby causing the vehicle to overturn and in-
jure the plaintiff.' The defendants' answer raised the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. At the trial,
defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the
evidence demonstrated the minor plaintiff had assumed the risk of
harm was denied, and the defense counsel then requested that the
judge instruct the jury on the doctrine of assumption of the risk. The
trial judge refused, holding that since Florida had recently adopted
a rule of comparative negligence2 the defense of assumption of the
risk had "merged into comparative negligence." '3 The trial court
instructed the jury that the minor defendant was negligent as a
matter of law and gave the jurors instructions on the law of compar-
ative negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs and the defendants appealed.'
In argument before the district court of appeal,5 the issue was
whether assumption of the risk was still viable as an absolute bar
to recovery subsequent to the adoption of comparative negligence.
The court held that it was still a valid defense and therefore ruled
the trial judge's refusal to give the jury instruction on assumption
1. The complaint against the minor defendant's father also alleged negligent entrustment
and failure to supervise. Dorta v. Blackburn, 302 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974),
rev'd, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
2. A pure form of comparative negligence was judicially adopted. Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Only two other states have judicially adopted comparative negligence:
California, in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); and Alaska, in Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
3. 302 So. 2d at 451.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 450.
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of the risk was in error;' accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
In separate cases involving injuries allegedly sustained from the
negligent operation of a vehicle7 and from the negligent construction
of a driveway," two other state district courts of appeal reached a
contrary conclusion on the same issue of law; they held that the
defense of assumption of the risk had merged with contributory
negligence. As a result of these conflicting decisions, certiorari was
granted by the Florida Supreme Court under conflict certiorari ju-
risdiction,' and, since the facts of the individual cases were not of
importance to the court, the cases were consolidated for review.1°
6. The district court stated that it had examined Hoffman and had determined that the
Florida Supreme Court impliedly recognized the continued existence of assumption of the risk
despite the adoption of comparative negligence. The district court concluded this because the
court in Hoffman had specifically declined to consider the continued vitality of assumption
of the risk as a defense subsequent to the adoption of comparative negligence. See Hoffman
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d at 439. Therefore, since assumption of the risk had been recognized as a
defense apart from contributory negligence prior to the adoption of comparative negligence,
the court concluded that the defense still existed. See Dorta v. Blackburn, 302 So. 2d at 451.
Also, the court noted that other jurisdictions with comparative negligence still retained as-
sumption of the risk as a defense and cited cases in support of its position. Id.
7. Parker v. Maule Indus., Inc., 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 348 So.
2d 287 (Fla. 1977). At the trial court, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendant
negligently operated a truck causing the plaintiff Parker to fall from it and suffer injuries.
The defendant's answer denied the negligence and affirmatively pleaded that Parker was
contributorily negligent and had assumed the risk. The jury found for the defendant and the
plaintiffs appealed on the basis that the court erred in charging the jury that assumption of
the risk was a complete bar to plaintiffs' recovery. The Court of Appeal for the First District
agreed with the plaintiffs' argument and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The
basis for the court's decision seemed to rest entirely on the conclusion that since assumption
of the risk is a special form of contributory negligence, it should be merged into the definition
of contributory negligence. See id. at 107.
8. Rea v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 348 So.
2d 287 (Fla. 1977). At the trial court, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against the
defendant for injuries suffered by the plaintiff when she fell into a hole in the driveway leading
to her home. The complaint contained multiple counts, one of which sought recovery based
upon defendant's allegedly negligent installation of the driveway. The defendant filed an
answer denying every allegation, and raised the defenses of assumption of the risk and contri-
butory negligence. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which
the court granted and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District,
apart from determining the impropriety of the trial court's summary judgment, reversed and
remanded with the explicit instruction that assumption of the risk was not a complete bar to
recovery since it had merged with and had become a phase of contributory negligence. The
court reasoned that though there was a theoretical distinction between assumption of the risk
and contributory negligence, pragmatically the distinction lost vitality as a result of the
adoption of comparative negligence. Id.
9. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
10. 348 So. 2d at 288.
Recent Decisions
The sole issue before the supreme court was whether assumption
of the risk should be abandoned as a complete defense to an action
for negligence in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. The court
unanimously agreed that any purpose to be served by the defense
of assumption of the risk was subsumed in the principles of negli-
gence or contributory negligence and, therefore, the rule of compar-
ative negligence enunciated in Hoffman v. Jones" would apply to
all cases where assumption of the risk was raised as a defense."
Accordingly, the decision of the district court in Blackburn v. Dorta
was reversed and remanded, and the two other district court deci-
sions disallowing the defense were affirmed.
In reaching this decision, the Blackburn court acknowledged the
drift toward eliminating the defense of assumption of the risk, 3
discernible in the abrogation of the defense in many jurisdictions
with comparative negligence statutes. 4 Moreover, it recognized the
confusion that had been generated by the use of the term assump-
tion of the risk to describe a number of very different legal con-
cepts."5 The court then proceeded to analyze and enunciate the dis-
tinctions between the different types of assumption of the risk, and
to determine whether the defense had a distinct purpose apart from
that of negligence and contributory negligence.
The Blackburn analysis of the different types of assumption of the
risk relied heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning in
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,"6 where the continued
use of assumption of the risk as a separate and distinct defense
apart from the plaintiffs contributory negligence or the defendant's
11. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
12. 348 So. 2d at 293.
13. Id. at 289.
14. The court cited fifteen comparative negligence jurisdictions that had merged the
defense of assumption of the risk with contributory negligence. 348 So. 2d at 289 n.3.
15. The court stated:
At the commencement of any analysis of the doctrine of assumption of risk, we must
recognize that we deal with a potpourri of labels, concepts, definitions, thoughts, and
doctrines. The confusion of labels does not end with the indiscriminate . . . use of the
terms "contributory negligence" and "assumption of the risk." In the case law and
among text writers, there have developed categories of assumption of risk. Distinctions
exist between express and implied; between primary and secondary; and between
reasonable and unreasonable. ...
Id. at 290 (footnotes omitted).
16. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959). This case was decided before New Jersey adopted
comparative negligence by statute in 1973.
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negligence was disapproved. 7 The Florida court, as well as the New
Jersey court, prefaced its discussion of assumption of the risk by
specifically excluding from consideration express assumption of the
risk, which would include express contracts not to sue for injury or
loss as a result of the covenantee's negligence, and situations in
which actual consent exists, as where an individual voluntarily par-
ticipates in a contact sport. 8 The court then directed its attention
to~the, implied forms and first, to primary-implied assumption of
the risk, which is not truly an affirmative defense. 9 The Black-
burn court reasoned, as did the court in Meistrich, that the issue
involved in determining whether the defendant was negligent or
whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk in the primary sense
was the same: did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff, and, if
he did, was that duty breached? 0 Consequently, the Blackburn
court decided that primary-implied assumption of the risk was but
an alternate expression for the proposition that the defendant was
not negligent and therefore this form was subsumed in the princi-
ple of negligence itself; to hold otherwise would only lead to confu-
sion of the jury.2'
17. Id. at 54-55, 155 A.2d at 96. In McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 274,
196 A.2d 238, 240 (1963), the court reaffirmed Meistrich, saying that there were but two issues
in a negligence case-negligence and contributory negligence-and it was erroneous to tell
the jury that assumption of the risk constituted still another.
18. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d at 290; Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,
31 N.J. at 48, 155 A.2d at 93.
19. Under implied assumption of the risk, the plaintiff is treated as if he had agreed to
relieve the defendant of any duty toward him. It represents a consequence that the law
attaches to various voluntary relationships. For example, a passenger who voluntarily rides
with a driver he knows to be intoxicated impliedly assumes the risk of harm occuring from
the driver's negligence. Primary assumption of the risk focuses on the defendant's conduct.
Rather than being an affirmative defense, it prevents the establishment of a prima facie case
of negligence. It is a way of expressing the idea that where the defendant owes no duty or
has not breached a duty owed to the plaintiff he cannot be negligent. In such a case, all risks
that fall outside the scope of the defendant's duty are "assumed risks." Primary assumption
of the risk usually arises where there is a limited duty owed to the plaintiff. For example, it
has generally been held that a licensee assumes the risk of defective conditions unknown to
the occupier of the premises. In such a situation, the occupier's only duty is to disclose
dangers known to him; hence, when harm occurs from other dangers, the licensee impliedly
assumes the risk of harm in the primary sense. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMS, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 21.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ]; James, Assumption of Risk,
61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Assumption]; Note, Contributory Negligence
and Assumption of the Risk-The Case for Their Merger, 56 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Merger].
20. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d at 291; Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,
31 N.J. at 49, 155 A.2d at 93.
21. The court stated:
This branch . . . of assumption of risk is subsumed in the principle of negligence itself.
Recent Decisions
The Blackburn court then focused on the status of secondary-
implied assumption of the risk, an affirmative defense, and abro-
gated the doctrine entirely-whether the plaintiff's assumption was
reasonable or unreasonable.22 The Florida court simply noted that
there was little to commend the defense of reasonable assumption
of the risk, which bars recovery to a plaintiff who reasonably en-
counters a known risk, and that in no Florida cases had the defense
been utilized.23 Thus, the only remaining element of the defense was
unreasonable secondary assumption of the risk. The court declared
that the basic inquiry at this point was whether the plaintiff acted
unreasonably, which was equivalent to asking whether the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent." Consequently, the court eliminated
unreasonable secondary assumption of the risk by merging it with
contributory negligence." In support of its decision, the Florida
court cited Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Tiller v. At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad," where the Supreme Court had inter-
preted a 1939 amendment authorizing comparative negligence to be
applied to the Federal Employers' Liability Act to have eliminated
"every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of the risk." The
Under our Florida jury instructions, the jury is directed first to determine whether. the
defendant has been negligent . . . .To sprinkle the term of assumption of risk into
the equation can only lead to confusion of a jury.
348 So. 2d at 291.
22. Secondary assumption of the risk, unlike primary assumption of the risk, is a measure
of the plaintiffs conduct and is an affirmative defense that is asserted by the defendant after
his negligence has been established: The essential element of secondary assumption of the
risk is that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encountered a risk created by defendant's
negligence. Merger, supra note 19, at 51. For example, a passenger in a car who goes along
with the driver to participate in a drag race could be said to impliedly assume the risk of
injury (in the secondary sense) from an accident that occurs as a result of the driver's
negligence. Conduct of the plaintiff in knowingly and voluntarily encountering a risk can then
be considered to be either reasonable or unreasonable. For other examples, see RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496C, Comment g (1965).
23. 348 So. 2d at 291.
24. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 (1965) (when the plaintiff voluntar-
ily consents to take an unreasonable chance, this type of secondary assumption of the risk is
but a special form of contributory negligence since the basis of the contributory defense is
the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct).
25. The Blackburn court did not explicitly cite Meistrich in support of its position for
abandoning reasonable and unreasonable secondary assumption of the risk; however, the
examples the court cited and the reasoning behind its decision were identical to those noted
by the New Jersey court. Compare Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291, with Meistrich, 31 N.J. at
53, 155 A.2d at 95.
26. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
27. Id. at 58.
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Blackburn court believed this opinion conclusively demonstrated
that the doctrine had caused a great deal of ambiguity in the law,
and that secondary assumption of the risk represented a morally
unacceptable social policy-one utilized to advance the industrial
revolution regardless of the cost of human suffering.2"
.A majority of states that have adopted a rule of comparative
negligence of general application 9 have either judicially or statuto-
rily rejected implied assumption of the risk for the same reasons
espoused by the Blackburn court. Although several jurisdictions,
some with and some without a rule of comparative negligence, still
recognize the defense of assumption of the risk, Blackburn aligns
itself with the majority which have determined that the doctrine of
implied assumption of the risk is confusing and tautological and
therefore should be supplanted by the principles of negligence and
contributory negligence."
28. 348 So. 2d at 292. The Blackburn court quoted Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Tiller,
where he noted that the ambiguity created by assumption of the risk "necessarily [did] harm
to the desirability of clarity and coherence in any civilized system of law. But the greater
mischief was that . . . 'assumption of risk' gave judicial expression to a social policy that
entailed much human misery." 318 U.S. at 69.
29. In the first half of the twentieth century, a number of states enacted comparative
negligence statutes of limited application that usually protected workmen in intrastate rail-
road accidents. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 387-94.
30. The current positions taken by those thirty-three states that have adopted a rule of
comparative negligence may be categorized as follows:
(1) Five states have resolved the problem statutorily by abolishing the legal doctrine of
assumption of the risk or by indicating that assumption of the risk should be considered the
equivalent of contributory negligence: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(h) (West Supp. 1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (West 1973) (exact status
of the doctrine is unclear); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977).
(2) Seven states have merged implied-secondary assumption of the risk into contributory
negligence by judicial decision with or after the adoption of comparative negligence: Nga Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (judicially adopted
comparative negligence and merged the defenses at the same time); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348
So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976); Springrose v. Willmore,
292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975);
McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); Sanders
v. Pitner, 508 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1973).
(3) Nine states had judicially eliminated the defense of assumption of the risk and contribu-
tory negligence before adoption of comparative negligence: Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61
(Alaska 1968); Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Hawaii 1, 406 P.2d 887 (1965); Fawcett v.
Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); Smith v. Blakey, 213 Kan. 91, 515 P.2d 1062 (1973);
Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971);
Joyce v. Quinn, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 580, 205 A.2d 611 (1964); Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital,
60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
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Having adopted comparative negligence, the Florida court reex-
amined the defense of assumption of the risk, concluding that the
arguments for abrogating the doctrine outweighed stare decisis.3'
But prior to Blackburn, a number of legal commentators 32 and
courts33 had called for abandonment of assumption of the risk as a
complete defense even without adoption of comparative negligence.
The primary reasons traditionally espoused for abrogating the de-
fense are that 1) the historical reason for the defense is no longer
extant since the doctrine was originally developed between master
and servant as a device to give maximum freedom to an expanding
industry;34 2) assumption of the risk is not favored by the courts
where use of the defense would produce a harsh result, and therefore
courts have undermined the doctrine by narrowly defining the risk
incurred;35 3) assumption of the risk serves no purpose that cannot
be integrated into either the principles of negligence (duty) or con-
tributory negligence; 3 and 4) since assumption of the risk describes
a variety of legal concepts, its indiscriminate use has led to a great
deal of ambiguity and confusion, a situation which can perhaps best
(4) Five states with comparative negligence recognize assumption of the risk as a separate
and complete defense to an action based on negligence: Spradlin v. Klump, 244 Ark. 841, 427
S.W.2d 542 (1968); Yankey v. Battle, 122 Ga. App. 275, 176 S.E.2d 714 (1970); Saxton v. Rose,
201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Munson v. Dishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 186 Neb,
778, 186 N.W.2d 492 (1971); Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (1958).
(5) Seven states apparently had not reclassified secondary assumption of the risk prior to
their adoption of comparative negligence and therefore must yet determine whether the
defense is to remain a complete bar to recovery or not: Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana,
New York, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
31. Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in Florida, the state had recognized
as distinct defenses assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. See, e.g., Byers v.
Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955).
32. James, Assumption of the Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Unhappy Reincarnation]; Symposium: Assumption of the Risk, 22 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1961); Merger, supra note 19.
33. Frelick v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 51 Del. 568, 150 A.2d 17 (1959); Parker v. Red-
den, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); Baltimore County v. State, 232 Md. 350, 193 A.2d 30 (1963);
Flegner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965).
34. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 348 U.S. 54, 69 (1943); Pound, The Economic
Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HAmV. L. REV. 365, 373 (1940).
35. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Minyard, 16 Ariz. App. 583, 494 P.2d 1328 (1972) (person who
parks a vehicle partially blocking a passageway between two buildings does not assume the
risk that the vehicle will be hit by another vehicle); Hawthorne v. Gunn, 123 Cal. App. 452,
11 P.2d 411 (1932) (lady sitting on man's lap in a moving car assumes certain risks, but a
collision is not among them).
36. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text infra.
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be resolved by eliminating the doctrine entirely.3 7 Many courts have
recognized that all these considerations militate against the contin-
ued viability of the defense of assumption of the risk. Blackburn
represents but another step toward elimination of the defense by
reclassification.38
While the defense of assumption of the risk has spawned a great
deal of confusion, there are theoretical justifications for its contin-
ued existence which the Blackburn court avoided or ignored. Sec-
ondary assumption of the risk is a separate and distinct defense
apart from contributory negligence because it includes reasonable
conduct by the plaintiff, whereas contributory negligence only in-
volves unreasonable conduct. 31 Also, it has generally been recog-
nized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an action
based on wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct'-but one can assume
the risk of such conduct." Furthermore, a subjective standard is
applied to assumption of the risk to determine whether the plaintiff
37. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 19, § 21.8 at 1191-92; Editorial, Assumption of the
Risk-A False Issue, 73 N.J.L.J. 346 (1950); Assumption, supra note 19, at 169.
38. It seems the underlying motivation behind the Blackburn decision to eliminate the
defense was merely to dispel the semantic and conceptual confusion that had arisen between
the different forms of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. This conclusion is
based upon the observation that the Blackburn court meticulously focused on the legal
distinctions between the different forms of assumption of the risk in an attempt to clarify
and then simplify the doctrine. Yet the court entirely ignored the fact that any argument
against assumption of the risk is reinforced by the adoption of a rule of comparative negli-
gence. Formerly, as a practical matter, whether the plaintiff was adjudged to have assumed
the risk or to have been contributorily negligent did not matter; both defenses were a com-
plete bar to recovery. But under a comparative negligence rule, if the plaintiffs conduct
constitutes both contributory negligence and assumption of the risk (i.e., the plaintiff acted
unreasonably in voluntarily assuming a known risk), the defendant has two separate defenses
for the same conduct. He could therefore circumvent the rule of comparative negligence by
asserting the assumption of the risk defense in a jurisdiction where assumption of the risk
remained separate from contributory negligence. This anomalous result can only be avoided
by merging secondary assumption of the risk with contributory negligence. See Merger, supra
note 19, at 64-65.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C, Comment g at 572-73 (1965).
40. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943); 57 AM. JUR. 2d, Negligence
§ 305 (1971).
41. Evans v. Holsinger, 242 Iowa 990, 48 N.W.2d 250 (1951) (if one voluntarily becomes a
guest in an auto knowing that the driver is under the influence of liquor, he assumes the risk
of accident); Waltanen v. Wiitala, 361 Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d 400 (1960) (assumption of the
risk is a defense to mere negligence or to willful and wanton conduct and hence passenger
assumes the risk of driving with intoxicated driver); Schubring v. Weggen, 234 Wis. 517, 291
N.W. 788 (1940) (assumption of the risk is not a species of contributory negligence and hence
administratrix could not recover for wrongful death of auto guest on theory intoxicated driver
was guilty of gross negligence).
Recent Decisions
knows, understands, and appreciates the risk, but an objective stan-
dard is applied to contributory negligence: the plaintiff is required
to have the knowledge, understanding, and judgment of a reasona-
ble man.2 Also, assumption of the risk concerns knowledge of a
danger and acceptance of it, whereas contributory negligence is a
departure from a standard of reasonable conduct. Thus, assumption
of the risk is a mental condition of willingness or consent,43 whereas
contributory negligence is more a matter of conduct. In theory then,
assumption of the risk is not based on the fault of the plaintiff but
on the plaintiff's implied agreement to take the risk of the harm that
was incurred.44 From this perspective, the defense is analogous to
consent, and that has been suggested as its basis.4" Consequently,
if the defense of assumption of the risk is not based on fault but
upon consent, a rule of comparative negligence apportioning dam-
ages on the basis of fault should not apply. 6
Despite these arguments for maintaining the doctrinal integrity
of assumption of the risk, arguments apparently rejected by the
Blackburn court, some courts and legal commentators have argued
that most of these distinctions between secondary assumption of the
risk and contributory negligence are more conceptual than real and
lead to anomalous results. For example, the notion that secondary
assumption of the risk is unique from contributory negligence be-
cause the former includes reasonable conduct whereas the latter
does not has been argued to be invalid because a reasonable decision
to encounter a known risk (labeled reasonable secondary assump-
tion of the risk) is often involuntary; therefore, it seems there can
be no secondary assumption of the risk that is both reasonable and
voluntary. 7 Moreover, to deny recovery to a plaintiff who reasona-
42. Rea v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 312 So. 2d 818, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd
348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, Comment d at 562-64
(1965).
43. See Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943) (passenger who voluntarily
rides with intoxicated driver assumes the risk of harm and is precluded from recovery because
of his voluntary assent to driver's condition which caused the injury); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 445-47 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSERI.
44. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122, 164-
65 (1961).
45. See PROSSER, supra note 43, § 68 at 446; see also Dunion v. Kaiser, 124 F. Supp. 41,
44 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (assumption of the risk means plaintiff has consented to relieve defendant
of an obligation toward him).
46. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 162-63.
47. Merger, supra note 19, at 55 (a plaintiffs conduct is not voluntary when defendant's
tortious conduct has left the plaintiff no reasonable alternative in attempting to avoid harm
1977-78
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bly encounters a known risk is inconsistent with the fault system of
loss distribution because it denies recovery to a plaintiff who was
without fault.4" The notion that contributory negligence cannot be
a defense to an action based on reckless conduct, whereas assump-
tion of the risk can be, has been rejected by some courts; hence,
some cases decided under comparative negligence have held that
when a defendant is guilty of reckless conduct or gross negligence
he is not precluded from apportionment of damages as between him
and a contributorily negligent plaintiff.49 The argument that sec-
ondary assumption of the risk requires a subjective test while contri-
butory negligence requires an objective one has been challenged as
being largely theoretical since the jury in the usual case cannot
distinguish between subjective and objective knowledge, unless the
plaintiff admits he knew and appreciated the risk. 0 The final argu-
ment for not abrogating the defense, that assumption of the risk is
based more on consent than fault, evades the issue that even con-
sensual conduct can be reasonable or unreasonable. Moreover, any
consent implied from the plaintiff's conduct is usually fictional be-
cause the injured person has not truly manifested his consent to
exculpate the defendant's negligence; instead, the law treats him as
having done so.' Thus, in view of all these considerations, it seems
there are no convincing practical or theoretical reasons why
secondary-implied assumption of the risk should be treated as a
defense distinct from that of contributory negligence, even without
adoption of comparative negligence. 2 Moreover, since the defense
to himself; in this situation the plaintiff's decision to encounter the risk is likely to be
reasonable, but not voluntary, because all the alternatives are unreasonable). See, e.g., Don-
ald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 94 N.W.2d 255 (1959) (court held that if a pedestrian, with
knowledge of the dangerous condition of an icy sidewalk, voluntarily attempts to walk on it,
pedestrian is not deemed to assume the risk of injury unless the city proves the reasonable
availability of a safer route of travel).
48. Merger, supra note 19, at 57.
49. Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966) (auto accident caused by
defendant's alleged willful and wanton negligence will not preclude apportionment of dam-
ages under Arkansas comparative negligence statute); Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (suggests there will be apportionment of damages
in all cases involving misconduct falling short of intentional); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d
1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (doctrine of gross negligence is abolished; conduct characterized as
gross negligence will be treated as ordinary negligence for purpose of comparison with a
plaintiff's conduct under comparative negligence).
50. See Comment, Distinction Between Assumption of the Risk and Contributory Negli-
gence in Wisconsin, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 460, 466.
51. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 155.
52. Before a state adopts comparative negligence, the disposition of assumption of the risk
Vol. 16: 417
Recent Decisions
has been misinterpreted, restricted, and revised, it has lost most of
its utility as a distinct doctrine and therefore should be abrogated.
In the future, other states reconsidering the status of assumption
of the risk after adoption of comparative negligence will have to
address issues the Florida court was either not confronted with or
avoided. States that have adopted comparative negligence by stat-
ute will initially have to decide the status of assumption of the risk
when the statute is silent or when there is no indication of legislative
intent to abolish the doctrine. Such is the case in Pennsylvania,
where comparative negligence was adopted by statute in 1976. 53
While some courts may defer to the wisdom of the legislators and
let them decide the disposition of assumption of the risk after adop-
tion of comparative negligence, consideration of its continued vital-
ity seems appropriate for judicial determination since assumption
of the risk is a judicially created doctrine. 54
In Pennsylvania, unlike Florida, there was substantial authority
prior to the adoption of comparative negligence that unreasonable
secondary assumption of the risk was synonomous with, or merely
a form of, contributory negligence; 5 indeed, some Pennsylvania
courts seem to treat the two defenses as equivalent and thus use the
doctrines interchangeably to describe the same conduct. 5 Conse-
quently, the main issue before the Blackburn court-whether to
merge unreasonable assumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence-should be readily resolved in Pennsylvania.
For Pennsylvania and any state that merged unreasonable sec-
ondary assumption of the risk into contributory negligence before
adoption of comparative negligence, one salient residuary issue will
and contributory negligence is relatively unimportant since no contradictions arise from the
use of the two defenses. However, after adoption of comparative negligence, various anomalies
arise from the availability of the two defenses. See note 37 supra, and notes 62 & 64 and
accompanying text infra.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2101, 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
54. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn; 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971) (court ruled that
the judicially created doctrine of assumption of the risk would be considered a phase of
contributory negligence).
55. See, e.g., Stephenson v. College Misericordia, 376 F. Supp. 1324 (M.D. Pa. 1974); see
also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); Ovja v. City of
Scranton, 65 Lack. Jur. 9, 55 Mun. 220 (Pa. C.P. 1962); Knepper v. East Taylor Township,
21 Cambria 63 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
56. See, e.g., Kuchinic v. McCrory, 439 Pa. 314, 266 A.2d 723 (1970); Hill v. Richards,
406 Pa. 452, 178 A.2d 705 (1962); Rauch v. Pennsylvania Sports & Enterprises, Inc., 367 Pa.
632, 81 A.2d 548 (1951).
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be the determination of the status of express assumption of the risk.
But there should be no reason to find that the adoption of Pennsyl-
vania's comparative negligence statute has altered the status of this
form of assumption of the risk. Assuming there is no general legal
prohibition against an express agreement to assume risks,57 a plain-
tiff should still be permitted to expressly agree to assume a risk of
harm from the defendant's negligent conduct. Several courts,58 in-
cluding the court in Blackburn,59 have clearly indicated that express
assumption of the risk remains untouched as a complete defense
after the adoption of comparative negligence. Nevertheless, any
analysis of the status of express assumption of the risk should in-
volve a weighing of the desirability of freedom to contract against
public policy considerations0 in allowing a plaintiff to expressly
agree to assume a risk of harm from the defendant's conduct.
Probably the more important issue before Pennsylvania courts
and before courts in other jurisdictions that have already merged
unreasonable assumption of the risk into contributory negligence
will be the status of reasonable secondary assumption of the risk.
Whatever effect it is now to have must be reconciled with the adop-
tion of comparative negligence. Comparative negligence statutes
apportion damages on the basis of fault, but a plaintiff who acts
reasonably in encountering a known risk cannot be regarded as "at
fault." The Blackburn court avoided this issue by simply stating
there were no cases in its jurisdiction where a person who acted
reasonably in encountering a known risk had been barred from re-
covery."1 A similar statement cannot be made in Pennsylvania since
the supreme court has determined that spectators who reasonably
57. See, e.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (where buyer signed sales
contract which contained seller's warranty excluding liability for negligence, buyer was bound
thereby); Graves v. Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 139 N.E. 280 (1923) (owners of a tug may restrict
their liability by special agreement); see also Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948) (exhaustive collec-
tion of cases on this subject).
58. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Meistrich v. Casino
Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83
Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973).
59. 348 So. 2d at 290.
60. On occasion, courts will specifically decline to enforce express contracts to assume a
risk, as being against public policy. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d
92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (invalidating a hospital patient's express agreement
to assume risks of medical negligence); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d
443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971) (lease provision exculpating the landlord from liability for injury
to lessee or anyone entering the building held void).
61. 348 So. 2d at 291.
Vol. 16: 417
Recent Decisions
encounter known risks at most sporting events should be barred
from recovery for harm incurred from such risks. 2 Consequently,
Pennsylvania's adoption of comparative negligence requires some
new thinking about the disposition of reasonable secondary assump-
tion of the risk.6" The Pennsylvania statute does not technically
apply to reasonable assumption of the risk, because there is no
negligence on the part of a plaintiff who acts reasonably; 4 thus it
could be argued that the defense still remains as a complete bar to
recovery. But the retention of reasonable assumption of the risk as
a complete defense in a comparative negligence jurisdiction pro-
duces an anomalous result. When the plaintiff is at fault (because
he acted unreasonably), his damages will be reduced in proportion
to his fault, but when he is without fault (because he acted reasona-
bly) in encountering a known risk, he is completely barred from any
recovery. Thus, the recovery of the plaintiff who acted unreasonably
is theoretically unlimited while that of the plaintiff who acted rea-
sonably is nil! To avoid some of these problems, commentators have
suggested reclassifying reasonable secondary assumption of the risk
as a duty question. 5 The practical effect of this reclassification is
to change the inquiry from one of evaluating the plaintiff's conduct
to one of evaluating the defendant's conduct. It also shifts the bur-
den of proof from the defendant (when assumption of the risk is a
defense) to the plaintiff (when assumption of the risk is reduced to
a duty question),66 and changes the question from one for the jury
to one for the court. 7 Moreover, if reasonable secondary assumption
62. See Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 214 A.2d 238 (1965).
63. Several courts and commentators have called for the abolition of reasonable secondary
assumption of the risk even without adoption of comparative negligence. Fawcett v. Irby, 92
Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155
A.2d 90 (1959); Ritter v. Beals, 225 Or. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961); Unhappy Reincarnation,
supra note 32; Merger, supra note 19.
64. The Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute applies only to a negligent plaintiff:
In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence .. . the fact that the
plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery.
where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant .
but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
65. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 19, § 21.7 at 1191; Unhappy Reincarnation, supra
note 32; Sherman, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 38 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 51, 74 (1974).




of the risk is instead to be considered in terms of a duty/no-duty
analysis, the scope of the duty should be clearly evaluated in each
case since in some situations the defendant's duty has traditionally
been a limited one.6
Assuming arguendo that Pennsylvania courts interpreted the
comparative negligence statute to be applicable to reasonable as-
sumption of the risk, such a ruling would create serious conceptual
difficulties for the trier of fact. It would be difficult for a jury to
compare reasonable conduct with culpable conduct and make an
apportionment of damages on that basis; it is difficult enough to
compare fault with fault, but to compare innocence with fault would
be impossible. 9 Of the five states that still permit assumption of the
risk to be a complete defense after adoption of comparative negli-
gence, 1' only one still permits reasonable assumption of the risk to
be a complete bar to recovery;7 ' the rest seem to apply assumption
of the risk as complete defense only when the plaintiffs conduct has
been unreasonable.The cumulative effect of the Blackburn decision and of decisions
of other jurisdictions both with and without a rule of comparative
negligence is essentially to abrogate the doctrine of assumption of
the risk, with the exception of the express form. Nonetheless, any
consideration of eliminating assumption of the risk after adoption
of comparative negligence should involve a weighing and balancing
of all the factors that have traditionally distinguished assumption
of the risk from negligence and contributory negligence principles.
The objective of comparative negligence, to apportion damages on
the basis of fault, should not be overlooked when using it as a vehicle
for eliminating the doctrine of assumption of the risk. The policy
justifications for any abrogation or emasculati6n of the doctrine
should be clearly adumbrated before any court pronounces the de-
mise of the defense.
Edward L. Korwek
68. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 19, § 21.7 at 1191; Unhappy Reincarnation, supra
note 32, at 191. See also note 19 supra (a traditional example of a limited duty situation).
69. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 9.4 at 153.
70. See note 30 supra (listing states that still recognize assumption of the risk to be a
complete defense after adoption of comparative negligence).
71. Yankey v. Battle, 122 Ga. App. 275, 176 S.E.2d 714 (1970).
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